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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Introduction
Benefit-cost analysis (Haab & McConnell, 2002; Thompson, 1980) is an
important tool for policy-makers to evaluate a proposed project, program, or policy
decision, such as a wetland restoration project, an air quality improvement project or a
wildlife protection plan. If the estimated benefit of a project outweighs the estimated
cost, there is a justifiable reason to implement that project; if the estimated benefit falls
short of the estimated cost, there is no strong economic rationale to put that project into
practice.
There is often a clear way to calculate how much it costs to implement a
proposed project. Obtaining the benefit component, however, is not that straightforward
because it involves placing values on goods and services that cannot be traded in the
market, thus for which there is no observable market price for reference. Non-market
valuation has been used to estimate the benefit people obtain from non-market goods or
services (Haab & McConnell, 2002). Before moving on, it is useful to discuss two
widely used measures of value in non-market valuation1: willingness to pay (WTP) and
willingness to accept (WTA). WTP is the maximum amount of money people are willing

1

WTP and WTA are also applicable for private goods.

1

to give up for obtaining improved quality or quantity, or avoiding the deterioration in
quality or quantity of a good; WTA is the minimum amount of money people require to
allow a loss of quality or quantity, or forgo a proposed improvement or increase in that
good.
Two approaches are currently widely used in non-market valuation: revealed
preference methods and stated preference methods. In revealed preference methods,
people’s preference towards the non-market good is derived through observed behavior
in private markets that are closely related to the non-market good, assuming that the
consumption of private goods is affected by the provision of the non-market goods. For
example, in the hedonic method, the air quality in the vicinity of home might affect the
living quality, which then affects residents’ purchasing behavior in the housing market.
Thus people’s preference towards air quality improvement can be elicited through
observed consumption change in the housing market. However, the assumption that there
is a linkage between the environmental good and the preference towards a marketed
good is not widely applicable. Examples to the point are existence value and bequest
value (Kopp, 1992; McConnell, 1983; Samuelson, 1948; Stevens, Echeverria, Glass,
Hager, & More, 1991). Existence value is the value of merely knowing the existence of a
particular environmental resource without using or observing that resource. Bequest
value is connected with the expected value presented to future generations. Neither of
these values can be observed by associated market behavior (Kopp 1992). The failure to
incorporate non-use value is a weakness and limitation of revealed preference methods.
The advantage of the stated preference method over the revealed preference
method is that the stated preference method incorporates values beyond use value
2

(Adamowicz, Boxall, Williams, & Louviere, 1998). In stated preference methods,
researchers use surveys to ask participants to state their choices in hypothetical settings.
Two important stated preference elicitation frameworks are dichotomous contingent
valuation and choice experiments (Adamowicz et al., 1998). In a dichotomous contingent
valuation survey, participants are typically asked whether they would like to pay a cost to
fund a project. The respondent’s answer is a binary “yes” or “no”. The distribution of
WTP could be estimated from participants’ responses to the randomly assigned amount
of cost.
In choice experiments, participants are typically faced with more than two
alternatives and are asked to choose their most preferred alternative. Each alternative is
described by a set of characteristics that are expected to obtain after the implementation
of that project in the chosen manner. These characteristics are termed as “attributes”; one
attribute is usually a specific cost of funding that alternative. For example, in a woodland
caribou habitat enhancement program in (Adamowicz et al., 1998), the attributes are
mountain caribou population, wilderness area, recreation restrictions, forestry industry
employment, changes to provincial income tax, moose populations and forest
management agreement area2. Each alternative describes a potential scenario that could
obtain by implementation of that alternative. Participants in choice experiments generally
make a sequence of such choices so that researchers can obtain a rich picture of people’s
preference. Within every choice set there is usually a “status-quo” option, which allows

2

The forest management agreement area is used to reflect the wilderness area as it is

negatively related with the latter. For more detail, refer to (Adamowicz et al., 1998)
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participants to choose to maintain the current situation at zero cost. By assuming they
choose to maximize their utility subject to budget constraint and observing how people
make tradeoffs between project attributes (including a cost attribute), researchers could
estimate their utility function and estimate their WTP for the project. One of the
advantages of choice experiments over dichotomous-choice contingent valuation is that
researchers could obtain people’s WTP for each attribute.
Though widely used since its advent, stated preference methods have met with
skepticism due to the “hypothetical” nature of survey questions used. A major concern is
that survey responses might not be reliable to make inference about people’s preference
because they are answering hypothetical questions (Arrow & Solow, 1993; Diamond &
Hausman, 1994). Amid those concerns, Carson and Groves (R. T. Carson & Groves,
2007, 2011) state that if the survey questions are consequential, meaning (i) participants
in the surveys believe their responses are going to affect whether and how the discussed
project would be provided, and (ii) they care about the outcome of the project, economic
theory could explain how respondents choose in those surveys. A way to make survey
questions consequential, for example, is to restrict participants to the relevant population,
and clearly state how their responses will be translated to the policy making process (R.
T. Carson & Groves, 2007, 2011). Even though it is not convincing to participants that
their responses are binding in deciding how the project would be provided, participants
could be made aware that their responses are an input to the decision making process
together with other inputs. In some surveys when there is no explicitly specified decision
rule stating how participants’ response would be translated to the policy decision making
process, it is suspected that participants who think the survey is consequential would
4

assume some decision rule is deciding the outcome, and this rule is usually plurality rule,
which states the alternative to be implemented is the alternative chosen by most
participants (Taylor, Morrison, & Boyle, 2010). In this thesis, the focus is on
consequential stated preference methods, because in inconsequential surveys, economic
theory makes no prediction about how one should vote because each vote has same effect
on the participant’s expected utility.
The econometric modeling process in stated preference methods assumes that
people choose their unconditionally most preferred option subject to budget constraints.
This assumption generally holds for one shot dichotomous choice question with a
plurality decision rule, because the availability of only two choices gives participants no
incentive to choose options other than their favorite choice. The one-shot dichotomous
choice question with a plurality decision rule is well known to be incentive compatible,
in sense that, the participant is best off when they reveal their unconditional preference
(R. T. Carson & Groves, 2007; Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, & Murphy, 1997).
When there are more than two choices, as in choice experiments, the valuation
question cannot generally be made incentive compatible because this type of question
can give the respondent an incentive to vote for choices other than his unconditionally
most preferred option (R. T. Carson & Groves, 2007, 2011). For example, in three
candidate voting scenario with a plurality decision rule, when the voter’s most preferred
option has little expected chance of winning, his optimal strategy is to vote for his
unconditionally second-most preferred option. If he votes for his unconditionally most
preferred option, this vote will not have any effect on determining the winner and he has
more chance of getting his unconditionally least preferred option and thus he is worse
5

off. If he turns to his unconditionally second-most preferred option, he is better off for
he can increase the probability of getting his unconditionally second preferred option
instead of the unconditionally least preferred option. In this way he is voting
strategically. An example is the US presidential election. A voter might have a minor
party candidate as his unconditionally preferred candidate. In this case he has an
incentive to vote for either the Democratic Party candidate or the Republican Party
candidate, because only these two candidates have a realistic chance of winning the
election. A vote for the minority-party candidate reveals his unconditional most preferred
option but is a “wasted” vote because this minority-party candidate has little chance to
win the election, so the voter could be able to affect his expected utility only by choosing
candidates other than his unconditionally most preferred one.
The voting behaviors discussed above are generalized as strategic voting, or
sophisticated voting and tactical voting in some literature (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino,
& Rohde, 1992; Kawai & Watanabe, 2012; Myatt, 2007; Niemi, Written, & Franklin,
1992). Strategic voting is characterized in two aspects. First, the voter cast such a ballot
in order to affect the voting outcome in a way favorable to himself (Abramson et al.,
2004). Second, the voter cast a ballot based on his perceptions about the prospects of the
candidates (Abramson et al., 2004). Strategic voters might or might not choose his
unconditionally most preferred option under the plurality rule, depending on his
perception about other participants’ votes. For example, if a participant perceives his
unconditionally most preferred option will be in the first place or the second place, he
will stick to his unconditionally most preferred option even if he is a strategic voter.
Participants of this kind cannot be distinguished from the type of voter whose motivation
6

is to always reveal his unconditional preference, without inquiring their motivation of
voting. From now on, a “strategic vote” refers only to a vote cast for a candidate other
than one’s unconditionally most preferred candidate when his preferred candidate is
perceived to have the smallest chance of winning.
Research Objectives
An experiment was designed in this work to examine strategic voting in a labcontrolled experiment that mimics choice experiments. In the experiment, participants
were asked to choose among three private items, each available at a specified price. They
made their choice under two decision rules. One is the plurality rule in which all
participants get the item that receives most votes. It is commonly used in choice
experiments and it is under this rule that strategic voting might occur. The second rule is
pay-and-go rule in which each participant gets the item he votes for. It is assumed that
under this rule a participant will vote for his unconditionally most preferred item given
he could get whatever he votes for. A participant is deemed as a mismatch voter if he
voted for different items under the two decision rules. It is further examined whether
mismatch voting is consistent with strategic voting. A mismatch voter is deemed as a
strategic voter if he cast a mismatch vote to vote for his unconditionally second-most
preferred option, given he perceives his unconditionally most preferred option will
receive fewest votes. The objectives of this research are to (1) observe the percentage of
mismatch voting and distinguishable strategic voting that occurred in the experiment; (2)
determine which factors affect people’s vote under the plurality rule, especially, whether
the expectation of other participants’ votes will affect an individual’s vote; and (3) test
7

whether “prompting” participants to think about the preferences of others affects their
strategic voting behaviors.
This work adds to the existing literature by presenting empirical evidence of
strategic voting in a homegrown value experiment which mimics choice experiment.
This work will help researchers who utilize choice experiments in welfare estimates to
analyze participants’ responses more critically and carefully.

8

CHAPTER II
RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Empirical Analyses of Incentive Properties of Stated Preference Methods
Empirical examination on incentive properties of stated preference methods has
been done in real life contingent valuation studies (DeShazo, 2002; Herriges, Kling, Liu,
& Tobias, 2010), choice experiments studies (Carlsson & Martinsson, 2001; McNair,
Bennett, & Hensher, 2011), induced value lab experiments in contingent valuation
settings (K. S. Carson, Chilton, & Hutchinson, 2009; Polome, 2003), induced value lab
experiments in choice experiments settings (Collins & Vossler, 2009), homegrown value
lab experiments in contingent valuation settings (Cummings, Harrison, & Rutström,
1995; Schläpfer & Bräuer, 2007), and homegrown value lab experiments in choice
experiments settings (Lusk & Schroeder, 2004).
An overview of current empirical studies about choice experiments identifies two
major trends: the first is that most studies focus on strategic incentives caused by the
repeated feature of choice tasks (K. S. Carson et al., 2009; R. Carson, Groves, and List
2006; McNair et al., 2011; Scheufele & Bennett, 2012). Though eliciting a rich picture of
participants’ preference, the repeated format might induce strategic incentives when
participants do not view those choice questions independently. For example, the
participants might have an incentive to reject the alternative even though it is preferred to
the status-quo option, because a similar alternative with a lower cost has appeared earlier
9

in a different choice question. The underlying assumption behind this behavior is that
their refusal of the more expensive alternative might potentially enhance the probability
of getting the alternative with the lower cost that appeared earlier (K. S. Carson et al.,
2009). This kind of strategic voting is detrimental to both researchers and participants.
For researchers, the unconditional preference is misrepresented. For participants, they
might not realize the consumer surplus they deserve when they hide their unconditional
preference. R. Carson et al. (2006) suggest convincing participants that their responses to
higher priced alternative has no effect on their prospect of obtaining the lower-priced
alternative might weaken the strategic incentives brought by repeated feature of choice
experiments.
The second trend is that most studies use the method of comparing WTP
estimates elicited from settings with varying incentives to examine the incentive
properties of choice experiments (K. S. Carson et al., 2009; R. Carson et al., 2006;
Collins & Vossler, 2009; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004; McNair et al., 2011). Some compared
the incentive compatible CV with non-incentive compatible CE (McNair et al., 2011),
while some others compared the hypothetical CE with binding CE settings (Lusk and
Schroeder 2004; Taylor et al., 2010). Some find significant difference in WTP estimates
(Taylor, Morrison and Boyle 2010), while some others find no such difference (Lusk and
Schroeder 2004). Few of these researchers have examined at the individual level whether
participants are voting strategically. Though R. Carson et al. (2006) and Collins &
Vossler (2009) have compared participants’ actual choice and predicted choice, their
main focus is still on WTP comparison and they did not directly detect the strategic
voting at individual level. Burton (2010) departs from the main trend in that he directly
10

examines participants’ behavior in stated preference settings. He sets up induced value
choice experiment to directly observe strategic behavior by financially rewarding those
who are successfully acting as if one or two certain attributes, which are assigned by the
experimenter, are the only factors that matter when they are answering the choice
experiment questions. He concludes that participants could bias the result even though
choice experiments are usually “too complicated to be manipulated strategically” when
they are incentivized. The limitation of this research is that through financially rewarding
those who successfully behaved strategically, participants are fully incentivized to choose
strategically. The result is difficult to be applied to real life choice experiments where
such incentives are not present.
Methods of Detecting Strategic Voting in the Lab and in the Field
The second category of related empirical literature concerns the method of
detecting strategic voting. While little research has been done to examine the voting for
second-most preferred pattern in stated preference settings, this type of strategic voting is
not new to ballot voting settings in political science area and induced value framework in
lab experiments. A review of empirical studies of strategic voting in political science is of
help in methodology.
The first method in existing literature to detect strategic voting is through selfreport by respondents in open-ended questions about their motivation of voting for a
particular alternative. For example, in Niemi et al. (1992), the participant in the survey is
characterized as voting tactically if he indicated his reason for voting for an alternative as
“I really preferred another party, but it had no chance of winning in this constituency”.
Similar to the self-report motivation method, Abramson et al. (1992) also rely on
11

participants’ responses to survey questions. The difference is that instead of directly
asking why participants cast a certain vote, they asked participants in the survey to
evaluate the preference ranking and perceived viability of the participant’s chosen
alternative. The participant who rates his chosen alternative as “same” or “lower”
preference but “higher” viability is characterized as a strategic voter since he is not
choosing the alternative with “higher” preference, which is deemed as his more preferred
one.
The second approach directly detects strategic voting by comparing the difference
between participants’ unconditional preference and their actual vote. The participants are
identified as strategic voters not only by their self-report, but also because they actually
vote for candidates other than their unconditionally most preferred one due to strategic
thinking (Blais, Young, & Turcotte, 2005; Meffert & Gschwend, 2011). This additional
requirement improves self-report method because the self-report method might suffer
from bias as the reliability of participants’ self-report might remain unclear (Alvarez &
Nagler, 2000). In Blais & Nadeau (1996) and Van der Straeten, Laslier, Sauger, & Blais
(2010), the voters are characterized as strategic voting if he votes for his second-most
preferred option rather than his most preferred option, given he perceives the former one
has better chance of winning than the latter one. In induced value experiments (Van der
Straeten et al., 2010), researchers design participants’ utility payoff so that this
information is known to researchers. The ways to reveal participants’ unconditional
preference ranking in surveys include asking participants to rate the candidates (Blais and
Nadeau 1996; Blais et al., 2005).

12

The third approach to detect strategic voting is based on random utility model. In
a study on a 1987 British election, Alvarez & Nagler (2000) incorporated the variable
that measures how likely a vote for a certain candidate will be wasted3 into the standard
random utility model. They predict sincere voters behave according to the standard
random utility model while strategic voters behave according to the improved random
utility model. The extent of strategic voting is calculated by the percentage of the voters
who are predicted to cast different votes under sincere voting assumption and strategic
voting assumption. They found the wasted vote indicators for one’s favorite candidate are
significantly negative; showing that the chance of one’s vote for his favorite will be
wasted has a significantly negative effect on his utility. Similar methodology has been
applied in Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, & Nevitte (2001) and Blais et al. (2005). Kawai &
Watanabe (2012) also measured strategic voting based on random utility model. Instead
of adding wasted vote indicators into the random utility model, they incorporate pivot
probabilities, which are the probability that one’s single vote will change the voting
result, into traditional random utility model to obtain expected random utility function.
Assuming all voters have same pivot probabilities due to poll information, they estimated
the random utility model and the percentage of strategic voters.

3

They measured this by two variables. One variable measures how far one's favorite runs

behind the other two; the other variable measures the closeness between two of one's less
preferred parties when one’s favorite is perceived to be voted least.
13

Marginal Contribution
In sum, current empirical literature examining incentive properties mainly focuses
on strategic incentives brought by the repeated feature of choice experiment questions.
The method mainly relies on comparing WTP estimates elicited from settings with
varying incentives instead of investigating participant’s behavior directly at an individual
level.
We add to the current literature by presenting such evidence. We add to the
current literature by examining the strategic behavior of voting for one’s second-most
preferred alternative when one’s most preferred is believed to have little chance of
winning in a choice experiment context. This type of strategic behavior has been
examined in election related political settings, but little study has been done to provide
such empirical evidence in choice experiments setting.
If the experiment result shows that strategic voting is not commonly observed
when participants are voting, researchers have more justification to apply choice
experiments to elicit people’s unconditional preference without suffering from biased
estimates due to strategic voting. If, on the other hand, strategic voting is frequently
occurring in our experiment, the implication is that in real choice experiments settings,
researchers have to take strategic voting into account when calculating welfare estimates.

14

We examined strategic voting using a homegrown value framework. Most current
research on incentive properties in the lab employs an induced value framework (e.g. Van
der Straeten et al., 2010; Burton 2010). In induced value experiments, preferences are
designed and assigned by researchers. A potential weakness of induced value framework
is that participants might never engage in strategic voting in the absence of receiving
information on the preference distribution, which might render the observation of
strategic voting from induced framework biased. In a homegrown value framework,
participants form their own preference and make their own choice without preference
being induced. In our homegrown value experiment, we tested whether prompting
participants to think about others’ vote will affect their own vote. If we do not observe a
significant difference in mismatch voting across treatments, it might suggest induced
value framework can be used without too much concern for whether the observed
experimental result is elicited by experiment design

15

CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is organized as follows: the first two sections discuss the conceptual
framework of choice experiment modeling and the theory of voting equilibrium; then we
develop a theory to combine choice modeling and strategic voting.
Choice Experiments Modeling
Economic Model
The economic model starts from direct utility maximization theory. It is assumed
that participant k maximizes his direct utility subject to budget constraints. That is,
max U k (c, Ai , Zk )

Ai ,c i 1,..., n

(3.1)

s.t.

pi  c  yk

(3.2)

where U k (c, Ai , Zk ) is participant k’s direct utility function, Ai , i  1,..., n is a dummy
variable which denotes alternatives i, c is a composite bundle of ordinary goods with
price normalized to 1, Z k is a vector of personal characteristics for participant k, pi is the
cost of Ai, yk is participant k’s income. Constraint (3.2) states the budget constraint.

16

From (3.2), we get

c  yk  pi

(3.3)

Substituting (3.3) into (3.1), we see that participant k will choose alternative i if and only
if
U k  yk  pi , Ai , Zk   U k  yk  p j , Aj , Zk 

, i  j

(3.4)

Random Utility Model
In order to account for unobservable factors, a random term  ki is added to the
utility function. Thus a participant will choose alternative i if and only if
U k  yk  pi , Ai , Zk    ki  U k  yk  p j , Aj , Zk    kj , i  j

(3.5)

This is the Random Utility model developed by McFadden (1974, 1980). The
probability for participant k to chooses i can be written as:

probk (choose i)


 prob 



 probk U k  yk  pi , Ai , Z k    ki  U k  yk  p j , Aj , Zk    kj , i  j
k

ki



  kj  U k  yk  p j Aj , Aj , Z k   U k  yk  pi Ai , Ai , Zk  , i  j

(3.6)

The likelihood function is
m

n

k

i

L   probk (choose i ) xik

(3.7)

where xik  1 if participant k chooses alternative i, 0 otherwise; m is the total number of
participants; n is the total number of alternatives. Note that in this model it is assumed
17

that individuals choose their unconditionally most preferred alternative. We adjust the
model to account for strategic voting in the third section in this chapter.
The parameters of the unconditional indirect utility function U k  yk  pi , Ai , Zk 
can be estimated through maximum likelihood method.
WTP Estimates
WTP is defined as the maximum amount of money people are willing to give up
for obtaining improved quality or quantity, or avoiding the deterioration in quality or
quantity of a good. In case of good changes, it is actually the compensating variation,
which is the negative cash transfer required for a person to achieve the utility level before
the good change happens.

A

Figure 3.1

WTP Derived from Hicksian Demand
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Figure 3.1 illustrates how WTP is derived from the Hicksian Demand. The
horizontal axis is the quantity of environmental good Q . The vertical axis is a person’s
income yk . His indifference curves are convex towards the origin point. Suppose the
person is at point A initially with income yk 1 and environmental good level Q0 . When
environmental good improves from Q0 to Q1 , he reaches a new point C, arriving at a
higher indifference curve with higher utility level. Keeping Q1 fixed, he will attain the
same utility as before when he is at point B, with Q1 and yk 0 . His willingness to pay for
the increase in the environmental good from Q0 to Q1 is equal to the income difference
between point C and point B, yk1  yk 0 .
WTP for alternative i can also be solved from unconditional indirect utility
function through, where Ai is the alternative i and A0 is the status-quo:

U k  yk  WTP, Ai , Zk   U k  yk , A0 , Zk 

(3.8)

Voting Theory
This section discusses the voting theory developed by Myerson & Weber (1993)
in the three-candidate voting setting under the plurality rule, which is an adjustment of
the standard theory allowing for strategic voting. Let v be the ballot vector the person
submits, v  (v1 , v2 , v3 ) , where vi stands for the number of votes the person casts for
candidate i, i  1, 2,3 . When abstention is not available, v could only take values in set

V  1,0,0 ,  0,1,0  ,  0,0,1
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Let u be a person’s utility vector, which states the person’s utility obtained from
each candidate. u  (u1 , u2 , u3 ) , where ui is the person’s utility if candidate i wins,

i  1, 2,3 . Refer to a person’s utility vector as his type.
Let p= (pij)ij be the pivot probability vector, where pij is the probability that
candidate i and j will be tied for the first place, i, j  1, 2,3 . Further assume pij = pji. A
voter can only affect his utility when his votes will affect the outcome. It is assumed that
the probability that a voter’s vote will change the outcome from i to j is pij (v j  vi )
The expected utility function for the person submitting a ballot v is
U (p, v, u) 



i , j  (1,2,3)

pij (v j  vi )(u j  ui )

(3.9)

It is assumed that the voter votes to maximize his expected utility. As only one of
vis is non-zero, the expected utility function can be rewritten as.
U (p, v, u)   v j  pij (u j  ui )
j

 p (u
i j

ij

j

i j

(3.10)

 ui ) is defined as the perspective rating of candidate j. Every voter

maximizes his expected utility level by voting for the candidate with highest perspective
rating. In developing equilibria, Myerson & Weber (1993) assume every voter has same
knowledge about preference distribution and pivot probabilities. Thus for every voter, p
is same. The equilibrium is defined as a voting outcome in which each voter has no
incentive to deviate from his current vote, given the votes of everyone else.
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Consider an example of the voting equilibrium theory from Myerson & Weber
(1993). In a three-alternative voting setting under the plurality rule, suppose there are
three types of voters with the following types and associated percentages:
Table 3.1

Proportion of Voting Type
Voter Type
A
B
C

Utility Vector
A

u =(10,9,0)
u B =(9,10,0)
u C =(0,0,10)

Proportion of Electorate
f (u A ) =0.3
f (u B ) =0.3
f (u C ) =0.4

Both type A and type B voters derive the least utility from candidate 3 and prefer
candidate 1 and 2, with slight difference in preference between candidate 1 and candidate
2. Type C voters derive the least utility from both candidate 1 and 2 and prefer candidate
3.
Under the plurality rule, there are multiple voting equilibria. One equilibrium
where a portion of voters turn to their second-most preferred option can be represented
as: a((1,0,0), u A )  0.3 , a((1,0,0), u B )  0.3 , a((0,0,1), uC )  0.4 , where a(v, u) states the
fraction of voters whose type is u, and who casts a ballot v. This equilibrium is supported
by the pivot probabilities p   p12  0, p13  1, p23  0 . From Table 3.2, it can be shown
that every voter chooses to maximize their expected utility to arrive at the outcome
specified previously. The equilibrium presents the example that B type voters turn to their
unconditionally second-most preferred option, candidate 1 based on the perception that
voting for their unconditionally most preferred option, candidate 2 will have no effect on
the final outcome.
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Table 3.2

Perspective Ratings under Equilibrium 1

Voter Type
A
B
C

Perspective Ratings
Candidate 3
Candidate 1
Candidate 2
-10
10
0
-9
9
0
10
-10
0

Optimal
Choice
Candidate 1
Candidate 1
Candidate 3

Another equilibrium can be represented as a((0,1,0), u A )  0.3 ,

a((0,1,0), u B )  0.3 , a((0,0,1), uC )  0.4 . It is very similar to the previous one with only
the difference being that A type voters turn to their unconditionally second-most
preferred option, candidate 2, based on the perception that voting for their
unconditionally most preferred option, candidate 1 will have no effect on the final
outcome. This equilibrium is supported by the pivot probabilities

p   p12  0, p13  0, p23  1 . Each type of voter’s optimal choice under the pivot
probabilities is shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3

Perspective Ratings under Equilibrium 2

Voter Type
A
B
C

Perspective Ratings
Candidate 3
Candidate 1
Candidate 2
-10
0
10
-9
0
9
10
-10
0

Optimal
Choice
Candidate 2
Candidate 2
Candidate 3

Theory of Voting under the Plurality Rule
Following from Myerson & Weber (1993) and Kawai & Watanabe (2012), we
adopt the following theory of voting under the plurality rule, which incorporates the
representative voter’s expectation of other people’s votes. We generalize the theory to
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allow for breaking and creating two-and three-way ties. Let a regime mnl be a voting
outcome4 perceived by the participant in which item l receives not more votes than item n
and item n receives not more votes than item m. Let i, j be generic items in the set
{m,n,l}. Let i > j indicate that the participant expects item i receives exactly one vote
more than item j, i >> j indicate that the participant expects item i receives two or more
votes more than item j, and i = j indicate that the participant expects items i and j receive
the same number of votes. Let i,j indicate either i > j, i >> j, j >i, j >> i, or i = j. All the
possible outcomes of other people’s votes are listed by regime in Table 3.4.
Let ui be the participant’s utility when he obtains item i. Taking abstention as the
baseline category, let U m be the expected utility gain obtained by the participant from
voting for item m instead of abstaining given a certain outcome of other people’s votes is
expected by the participant. U m could take five different values, under different
expectations about the distribution of other people’s votes. The first possible value U m
could take is 0, this happens when item m will lose even the person votes for m5. When
voting for m will create or break a two-way tie between m and n6, U m equals (1/2)(um –

4

This outcome excludes the participant’s own vote.

5

Specifically, it happens when m >> n, l; m > n >> l; m > n > l; m > n = l; n >> m, l; l >>

m, n; m >> l, n; m > l >> n; m > l > n; m > l = n; n >> l, m; n > l >> m; n > l > m; n = l >>
m; l >> n, m; l > n >> m; l > n > m and l = n >> m.
6

In the event of a tie, the winner is chosen randomly with equal probability of each tied

choice.
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un)7. Similarly, U m equals (1/2)(um – ul) when voting for m will create or break a twoway tie between m and l. When voting for m breaks a three-way tie, that is, within the
regime m=l=n, the participant’s utility gain is um – (1/3)(un + ul+ um)=(2/3)um – (1/3)(un +
ul). When voting for m creates a three-way tie, that is, within the regime l=n>m, the
participant’s utility gain is (1/3)(un + ul+ um)- (1/2)(un + ul)= (1/3)um – (1/6)(un + ul).
The expected utility gain for voting for m instead of abstaining is the sum of all
expected utilities in each regime weighted by the probability of that regime happens. Let

Uˆ m denote the utility gain from voting for m instead of abstaining:
Uˆ m  Tmn (1/ 2)(um  un )  Tml (1/ 2)(um  ul )
Tmnl  2 / 3 um – 1/ 3 un  ul   Tmnl 1/ 3 um – 1/ 6  un  ul 

(3.11)

where Tmn denotes the probability that the participant’s vote for m will either break or
create a two way tie between m and n; Tml denotes the probability that the participant’s
vote for m will either break or create a two way tie between m and l; Tmnl denotes the
probability that the participant’s vote for m will break a three way tie between m, n and l;

Tmnl denotes the probability that the participant’s vote for m will create a three way tie
between m, n and l. The theory predicts the participant will choose item i such that

Uˆ i  Uˆ j for all j , and i, j m, n, l .

7

Specifically, it happens when m = n >> l; m = n > l; n > m >> l; n > m > l; n > m = l; n =

m >> l; n = m > l and n > l = m.
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Making abstention the baseline choice does not affect the theory in any essential
way. Because the baseline category utility is subtracted from every expected utility term,
the relative size of each term is unchanged. People make decisions by comparing relative
terms, so the choice of baseline category, whether it be abstention or voting for some
item, is unessential.
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The Utility Gain from Voting for m in All Possible Regime

Table 3.4
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(2/3)um – (1/3)(un + ul)

(1/3)um – (1/6)(un + ul)

0
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0
0
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0
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Experiment Procedures
A lab-controlled experiment was designed to examine strategic voting in settings
that are similar to choice experiments.
Participants were recruited by class announcement and campus flyers. A
maximum of 16 participants participated in each session. A $5 show-up fee was ensured
whenever participants showed up. An additional $10 endowment fee was given to
participants at the beginning of the experiment. They were presented with three choice
sets each of which contained three items. The experimental items were commonly used
goods that can be purchased in a store at around $10-$20, and they were available at a
specified price in the experiment. Participants were asked to make two choices for each
choice set. The first choice was under the plurality rule, in which everyone gets the item
most people vote for. This rule is widely used in real life choice experiments, wherein
there are possible incentives for strategic voting. The second choice was under the payand-go rule in which the participant gets what he votes for. This decision rule is similar to
buying items in a store. People choose their most preferred item, pay for it and take it
home. It is incentive compatible because participants have no incentives to misrepresent
their preference given that they can get what they vote for. In total, participants made 6
choices for 3 choice sets, each of which was referred to as a “task” (task 1, task 2, etc.). A
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six-sided die was used to decide which choice they made was actually binding. The
presence of a six-sided die does not affect voting incentives under each rule as each one
of the six scenarios had an equal chance of independently deciding the outcome.
Participants were made aware of this detail before they voted so that they would make
independent choices among six tasks.
The choice question for the plurality rule choice is:
(1) If I roll a 1 at the end of the experiment, you will receive the item that most
people choose in this task after paying the specified price out of your $10. Please
circle your choice on the sheet labeled “Task 1”.


Item 1



Item 2



Item 3

The number 1 in “If I roll a 1” is replaced with appropriate task number (1, 3, and
5). The choice question for the pay-and-go rule choice is:
(2) If I roll a 2 at the end of the experiment, you will receive the item that you choose
in this task after paying the specified price out of your $10. Please circle your
choice on the sheet labeled “Task 2”.


Item 1



Item 2



Item 3
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We assume people vote for their unconditionally most preferred option under the
pay-and-go rule. We observe if participants do not vote for their unconditionally most
preferred option under the plurality rule by comparing their two votes.
In order to detect whether the observed mismatch voting is due to strategic voting,
we need to know participants’ full preference ranking of the three items and their
perceptions about how other participants are going to vote. Participants’ unconditionally
most preferred option is observed by their choice under the pay-and-go rule. Their
unconditionally second-most preferred option information is obtained by directly asking
participants what their second choice is under the pay-and-go rule given their first choice
is not available. Thus their full preference rank within each choice set is obtained.
Below is the question participants answered regarding their second-most preferred
option.
In Task 2, you were asked to choose one of the three items under the assumption
that you would pay for and receive the item you chose (look at the projector screen for a
reminder of the items and their prices). Suppose the item you chose were not available
and that only the other two items were available. Which of the other two items would you
choose?
If my first choice were not available, I would choose the
.
Participants were also asked to state their perceptions about how other
participants are going to vote in tasks where the plurality rule is the decision rule. The
perception question about task 1 is as follows.
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Which of the following statements best describes your perception of peoples’
choices in task 1?
Instructions:
Step 1) First, please carefully read statements a, b, c, and d.
Step 2) Then clearly circle your response (a, b, c, or d).
Step 3) Then answer any questions within your circled response.
a. I think roughly the same number of people chose each item.
b. I think I know which item the most people chose, which item the second-most
people chose, and which item the fewest people chose.
 Which item do you think the most people chose? Circle your response.
1
2
3
 Which item do you think the second-most people chose? Circle your
response.
1
2
3
c. I think I know which item the most people chose, but I am not sure which of the
other two items more people chose.
 Which item do you think the most people chose? Circle your response.
1
2
3
d. I think I know which item the fewest people chose, but I am not sure which of the
other two items more people chose.
 Which item do you think the fewest people chose? Circle your response.
1
2
3
After the voting and perception questions, participants were asked to fill in a
questionnaire regarding their demographic information such as age, gender, race, and
voluntary comments about the experiments.
Participants were also asked how well they understood the perception questions in
the questionnaire. The question is as follows.
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Recall that in tasks 1a, 3a, and 5a, you were asked to state your predictions of
how you thought participants would vote over the three items in tasks 1, 3, and 5,
respectively. Do you think you understood what we were asking you to do in tasks 1a, 3a,
and 5a?
a.
b.
c.

I think I understood right away what you wanted me to do in tasks 1a, 3a,
and 5a.
I struggled a bit at first, but I think I eventually understood what you
wanted me to do in tasks 1a, 3a, and 5a.
I am still not sure what you wanted me to do in tasks 1a, 3a, and 5a.

Participants were also asked what they thought about the preference distribution
for task 6 in the questionnaire. The questions are as follows.

1) The following table shows some possible preference rankings over the three
items in task 6 at their respective prices (look at the projector screen for a reminder of
the items and their prices). There are
participants in the experiment today.
Based on your best guess, please write in the column the percentage of people in today’s
experiment that you believe would have the specified preference ranking.
My best guess as to the
percentage
of participants here today
with these preferences is:
Prefers item 1 to item 2, and prefers item 2 to item 3.
Prefers item 1 to item 3, and prefers item 3 to item 2.
Prefers item 2 to item 1, and prefers item 1 to item 3.
Prefers item 2 to item 3, and prefers item 3 to item 1.
Prefers item 3 to item 1, and prefers item 1 to item 2.
Prefers item 3 to item 2, and prefers item 2 to item 1.
Total (cannot be greater than 100%):
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2) Do you think you understood what we were asking you to do in the previous
question?

a.
b.
c.

I think I understood right away what you wanted me to do in the previous
question.
I struggled a bit at first, but I think I eventually understood what you
wanted me to do in the previous question.
I am still not sure what you were asking me to do in the previous question.

3) In Question 1, you stated your opinion of what percentage of people here today
has various preferences over the three items in task 6. We asked every participant that
same question. Do you think all other participants here today will give the same answers
to the Question 1 as you did? (Note: if you believe even one participant will give much
different responses to the previous question, you should circle “No”.)
Yes

No

Question 1 elicited participants’ perception about preference distribution. It is
based on the preference distribution that voting equilibrium can be derived. Given the
complexity of question 1, question 2 was asked to examine to the cognitive difficulty
participants felt when they answered question 1. The voting equilibria theory developed
by Myerson & Weber (1993) and Kawai & Watanabe (2012) assume all participants hold
the same perception about preference distribution. Question 3 was asked to examine that
assumption in our experiment.
In each session, voting questions and perception questions were arranged in a way
that participants could not jump back to previous questions to make any changes, or look
forward to future questions. During the experiment, communication between participants
was discouraged by physical arrangement of voters and by barriers placed between
stations. The die was thrown after the questionnaire was completed, the outcome was
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determined and announced immediately and every participant got the item he earned after
paying the tagged price out of his endowment. They left the experiment with their items,
their show-up payments, and any remainder of their endowments.
The experiment procedures are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1

Experiment Procedures

o sample choice task(plurality rule)*
o choice task 1 (plurality rule)
perception question regarding task 1**
o choice task 2 (pay-and-go rule)
second-most preferred option question regarding task 2
o choice task 3 (plurality rule)
step 1
perception question regarding task 3
o choice task 4 (pay-and-go rule)
second-most preferred option question regarding task 4
o choice task 5 (plurality rule)
perception question regarding task 5
o choice task 6 (pay-and-go rule)
second-most preferred option question regarding task 6
step 2
questionnaire
six-sided die threw
step 3
outcome announced
items given out, payments made
* A sample task was completed to make sure choice task 1 was well understood by
participants.
** As will be explained, there were two treatments: one in which the perception question
came after its corresponding choice task, and one in which it came before its
corresponding choice task.
Choosing the Experiment Items
Employing the homegrown value framework, an important decision to make
was which items would be in the choice sets.
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Budgetary and time constraints restricted the set of feasible items. It is preferable
to experiment with goods that are easily obtained so that purchase can be made at any
time because some sessions were done on consecutive workdays (Purchasing the items
for all sessions ahead of the experiment would be too expensive as in this way we need to
prepare 168 of each experimental item for every session instead of for only one session).
The experimental items are commonly used items to increase the possibility that
everybody would have well-defined preferences towards them. If most of the participants
do not have a well-defined preference towards the items, their choice will be based on
non-observable considerations which will render the data in low quality. For budget
considerations, the experimental items are with price below $25.
It is desirable that the experiment goods are diverse in usage and type so that
participants will be less likely to be indifferent towards all the available options, in which
case, the three-alternative setting will reduce to the uninteresting two-alternative or onealternative setting.
The following experimental items were chosen: MSU medium size cowbell; MSU
tervis tumbler; Gift certificate of Barnes and Noble bookstore within $12 value; Gift
certificate of campus dining places with $10 value; Gift certificate of local movie theater
within $11 value. They are easily available, commonly used, inexpensive and diverse.
Outside Option Concerns
Cherry, Frykblom, Shogren, List, & Sullivan (2004) found that that people are
bidding significantly lower when they have access to the same item outside the

8

Sixteen is the maximal number of participants in each session.
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experiment, that is, an outside option, at a lower price. In our experiment, each item was
available at a specified price that was lower than its market price. Although the
experiment form is multinomial choice instead of bidding, we followed the argument in
Cherry et al. (2004) and decided that by lowering the tagged price, the options were made
attractive so that the effect of a cheaper outside option would be reduced.
Detecting Voting Behaviors in Three-alternative Voting
It is expected that there would be participants whose votes hold consistent under
two decision rules and also participants who vote for different items under either decision
rule, which is characterized as mismatch voting in the experiment. In this thesis, we are
interested in mismatch voting resulted in strategic voting (Kawai & Watanabe, 2012).
With additional information, that is, participants’ unconditional second-most preferred
option and their expectation about the winning prospect of their unconditional most
preferred one, we can examine, for those participants who did not choose their
unconditionally most preferred option under the plurality rule, whether they actually
voted for their unconditionally second-most preferred option and, if so, whether their
choice is consistent with strategic voting theory.
It can also be detected whether a participant who is theoretically in a position of
strategic voting, yet casts a vote for his unconditionally most preferred option. This is
when a participant perceives his favorite option is going to receive fewest votes, and still
votes for his most preferred option under this perception.
For another portion of participants, their dominant voting strategy based on
strategic voting theory under plurality rule coincides with his unconditional most
preferred option as they believe their unconditionally most preferred option will not
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receive fewest votes. Under either rule, the participant will vote for his unconditionally
most preferred option, thus no conclusion can be made regarding whether he is an
“always votes for favorite” type voter or a voter motivated by strategic voting.
Hypotheses and Econometric Models
Hypotheses
Our central hypotheses are the following:
Hypothesis 1: mismatch voting occurs at a significant level in the
experiment.
This hypothesis examines whether participants choose their unconditionally most
preferred option. It can be examined by a proportion test. On the basis of hypothesis 1,
hypothesis 2 examined whether people who cast mismatch votes do so in a manner
consistent with strategic reasons, that is, they vote for their second-most preferred option
when they believe their most preferred has the lowest chance of winning.
Hypothesis 2: the percentage of mismatch voting consistent with strategic
voting is significantly greater than 0.
Hypothesis 2 can also be examined by a proportion test.
Whether voting questions come before or after perception questions could matter
because if perception questions come before voting questions, they might induce
participants to take the perception of others’ votes into consideration when they are
making a decision when they otherwise would not do so. In order to control this effect,
the final experiments were split into two treatments: in one treatment, we elicited
participants’ perception of the vote distribution first, and their votes second; in the other
treatment, we elicited their votes first and their perception second. The former treatment
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is termed “prompting treatment”; and the second treatment “control treatment”. Our
hypothesis regarding prompting treatment is the following:
Prompting Hypothesis: mismatch voting occurs at a significantly greater
level in prompting treatment than that in control
treatment.
Prompting hypothesis can be tested by examining the variable coefficient in a
regression model (to be discussed in next section). An alternative way is a proportion test.
We also tested whether participants catch on the idea of taking others’ votes into
account when they are voting for choice set that comes later at the experiment. As
respondents are exposed to the perception questions in earlier choice tasks, they are
gaining experience and thus potentially more likely to vote strategically in choice sets
that come later. In order to control this effect, we define the choice task 5 and 6 as later
choice tasks, and the choice task 1, 2, 3 and 4 as earlier choice tasks. A dummy variable
“later” equals 1 when the participants’ choice are made under choice task 5 and 6; “later”
equals 0 otherwise. Hypothesis regarding learning effect is the following:
Learning Hypothesis: mismatch voting occurs at a significantly greater
level in later choice tasks than that in earlier choice
tasks.
Learning hypothesis can be tested by examining the variable coefficient in
regression model (to be discussed in next section).
Econometric Models
We examine the econometric models shown in (4.1) and (4.2). Variable
explanations are given in Table 4.2.
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mismatchi  ai 0  ai1nochance  ai 2 prompting  ai 3later
 ai 4 seta  ai 5 setb  ai 6 white  ai 7 male  ai 8age   i

(4.1)

voteforsei  bi 0  bi1nochance  bi 2 prompting  bi 3later
bi 4 seta  bi 5 setb  bi 6 white  bi 7 male  bi8age   i

(4.2)

The treatment variable is prompting which equals 1 if the voting is under the
prompting treatment, 0 if under control treatment. later equals 1 whether the participant
is voting for choice set that comes third, 0 otherwise. Participants made 6 choices for 3
choice sets in total. In order to model the difference in the observed mismatch and
voteforse between choice sets, variables seta and setb is introduced. seta equals 1 when
the participant is voting for choice set a, 0 otherwise. setb equals 1 when the participant is
voting for choice set b, 0 otherwise. Choice set c is the baseline category.
In order to control for the effects of personal characteristics on voting behavior
(Alvarez, Boehmke, & Nagler, 2006; Blais et al., 2005), personal characteristics such as
race, gender and age are also included as control variables.
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Type

binary

binary

binary

binary

binary

binary
binary
binary
binary
numerous

mismatch

voteforse

nochance

prompting

later

seta
setb
white
male
age

Description
equals 1 if the participant cast mismatch votes under two different
decision rules, 0 otherwise.
equals 1 if the participant cast mismatch votes under two different
decision rules, and he voted for his second-most preferred option
under the plurality rule, 0 otherwise.
equals 1 if the participant held the perception that his most preferred
option will receive fewest votes; 0 otherwise.
equals 1 if the participant answered the perception question after he
voted.
equals 1 if the choice set the participant voted for the choice set that
comes third in the session.
equals 1 if it is voted for choice set a, 0 otherwise.
equals 1 if it is voted for choice set b, 0 otherwise.
equals 1 if the participant is white; 0 otherwise.
equals 1 if the participant is male; 0 otherwise
the age of the participant

Variable Description

Variable

Table 4.2
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CHAPTER V
PRETEST SESSIONS

This chapter discusses the pretests we did. The experimental design in chapter iv
is based on improvements made to the experimental design according to pretest session
results.
Doing pretests is important in this research because it can be examined in the
pretests whether the chosen experimental items were appropriate, whether the experiment
procedure is clear and error free, and whether sufficient and quality data can be generated
to support the data analysis. The most important objective of the pretest is to choose final
experiment goods from available alternatives and to finalize the experiment procedure.
Four sessions of pretest experiments were conducted on the 19th, 20th, 21st, and
27th of June, 2012, with 10-15 participants in each session. A total of 52 participants did
the pretest experiments. Participants were allowed to register for only one of the four
sessions. They were informed they were participating in experiments, not particularly
pretests. Every participant was paid a $5 show-up fee and was ensured the $10
endowment at the start of pretest.
Every pretest session differs in regards of the choice sets of items, the experiment
procedure details, and question set-up because adjustments were made to the upcoming
session based on the previous pretest outcomes.
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Pretest Session 1
Session 1 asked people to make six sets of choices, which were referred to as
“tasks” in the experiment. The first five choice tasks were under the plurality rule and the
sixth was under the pay-and-go rule. Five different choice sets were used so that we can
check whether there are items that nobody votes for. If there is an option that few people
choose, and if participants also hold the perception that few people would vote for that
option, then the three alternative voting setting is essentially equivalent to the two
alternative voting setting, which is undesirable because the problem of strategic voting
vanishes in this situation. Task 6 is targeting the same choice set of goods as task 5, with
only the difference being that the plurality decision rule was used in task 5 whereas payand-go decision rule was used in task 6. By comparing participants’ choice made under
task 5 and task 6, it can be concluded whether participants are voting for their
unconditionally most preferred option under the plurality rule. A perception question and
a questionnaire followed. The perception question was asked only about task 5, and it
asked how the participant thought other people would vote (The question presented to
participants can be referred to in chapter iii).
In every choice set, there were four options, three of which were for one of three
items and the fourth was an abstaining option. Abstaining options was introduced to
allow participants to express their indifference towards the available options. In real life
choice experiments, it is customary to include an abstention option in choice tasks. The
advantage of the presence of abstention options is to avoid a forced choice from
participants by requiring them to choose one among several alternatives (Banzhaf,
Johnson, & Mathews, 2001). By casting an abstaining option under the plurality rule, the
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participant would get the item most people chose and have to pay the corresponding
price. By casting an abstaining option under the pay-and-go rule, which item the
participant will get and pay for was decided by rolling a die.
The plurality task sheets, pay-and-go task sheet and perception question sheet
were contained in separate envelopes. The questionnaire was handed out after all voting
and perception questions have been done. During the pretest, participants were instructed
to open the particular envelope and discouraged from opening unrelated envelopes. In
this way, participants were kept from looking at question sheets before they are instructed
to do so, because knowing future experiment procedure might affect participants’ current
decision.
The voting results in session 1 are as follows in the Table 5.1. It shows that every
choice was voted at least once. We decided the experimental choice set does not suffer
from the problem that there are certain goods that nobody voted for.
Pretest Sessions 2, 3, and 4
In sessions 2, the following adjustments were made: First, only three choice sets,
choice set 3, choice set 4 and choice set 5, were used, and participants made two choices
for each choice set: one choice was under plurality rule and the other was under the payand-go rule. The benefit is that more data about voting behavior under two different
decision rules can be generated. Choice set 2 was not used in session 2 because it was
voted evenly in session 1, and it is assumed that less strategic voting would occur in even
voting distribution. The reason is that people are incentivized to vote for their
unconditionally most preferred option given they perceive the votes are evenly
distributed.
42

Table 5.1
Task

Pretest Session 1 Voting Result
Choice Set

Item number
1
2
3

Item Description
Gift Card(Union)
Gift Card(B&N)
1
1
Gift Card(Movies)
Abstaining
1
Cowbell
2
Mug
2
2
3
Gift Card(Movies)
Abstaining
1
Gift Card(Union)
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
3
3
Tumbler
Abstaining
1
Cowbell
2
Mug
4
4
3
Tumbler
Abstaining
1
Cowbell
2
Gift Card(Union)
5
5
3
Tumbler
Abstaining
1
Cowbell
2
Gift Card (Union)
6
5
3
Tumbler
Abstaining
Notes: There were 13 participants in session 1.

Price
5
7
7
9
5
9
6
8
7
8
0
4
10
5
7
10
5
7

Total Votes
1
5
6
1
4
4
4
1
4
7
2
0
4
5
1
3
4
7
1
1
4
6
3
0

Second, for every choice set of items, participants were asked about their secondmost preferred option and their perceptions about other participant’s votes. In order to
conclude whether participants who voted differently under two decision rules are
strategic voters, we need more information regarding their perceptions and second-most
preferred option.
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Third, no abstention option was available for participants. Including abstention
options have potential disadvantages such as the loss of information about participants’
relative preference towards the alternatives. It is suggested that whether or not to include
abstention options depends on the contexts (Banzhaf et al., 2001). In our experiment,
participants were asked about how they perceive other participants will vote. The
presence of abstaining option complicates the perceptions questions because it is unlikely
participants could have known how many people will abstain from voting. The risk,
however, by forgoing the abstaining options, is that participants might be forced to make
a choice in case they do not have a preference. Voting results from session 1 indicates
that in task 1, task 2, and task 4, forcing participants who originally chose to abstain to
make a choice among three options might change the final voting outcome. (For example,
in session 1 task 1 as Table 5.1 shows, by forcing every people to choose among three
options, a two-way tie between item 2 and item 3 might be introduced). However, we
ultimately decided that the benefits of forgoing abstaining options outweigh the costs
because voting behavior under two different rules is the focus of this research instead of
participants’ preference.
The voting results of session 2 are as follows in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2

Pretest Session 2 Voting Results

Task Choice Set

Item number

Item Description

1
Cowbell
4
1
2
Mug
3
Tumbler
1
Cowbell
4
2
2
Mug
3
Tumbler
1
Gift Card(Union)
3
3
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Tumbler
1
Gift Card(Union)
3
4
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Tumbler
1
Cowbell
5
5
2
Gift Card(Union)
3
Tumbler
1
Cowbell
5
6
2
Gift Card(Union)
3
Tumbler
Notes: There were 14 participants in session 2.

Price

Total Votes

8
0
4
8
0
4
6
8
7
6
8
7
10
5
7
10
5
7

3
7
4
2
7
5
5
7
2
5
6
3
2
8
4
4
8
2

As the objective in the pretest is to experiment on choice set alternatives and
decide the choice sets to be applied in final experiments, a different combination of
choice sets was used in session 3. The experiment procedure was same as that in session
2. The voting results of session 3 are as follows in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3

Pretest Session 3 Voting Result

Item
Item Description
Number
1
Gift Card(Union)
1
1
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Gift Card(Movie)
1
Gift Card(Union)
1
2
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Gift Card(Movie)
1
Cowbell
5
3
2
Gift Card(Union)
3
Tumbler
1
Cowbell
5
4
2
Gift Card(Union)
3
Tumbler
1
Gift Card(Union)
3
5
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Tumbler
1
Gift Card(Union)
3
6
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Tumbler
Notes: There were 15 participants in session 3.
Task

Choice
Set

Price

Total Votes

5
7
7
5
7
7
10
5
7
10
5
7
6
8
7
6
8
7

5
5
5
5
6
4
4
10
1
4
8
3
7
5
3
6
6
3

Similarly, another combination of choice sets was used in session 4. The
experiment procedure was same as that in session 2. The voting results of session 4 are as
follows in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4

Pretest Session 4 Voting Results

Item
Item Description
Number
1
Gift Card(Union)
3
1
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Tumbler
1
Gift Card(Union)
3
2
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Tumbler
1
Gift Card(Union)
1
3
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Gift Card(Movie)
1
Gift Card(Union)
1
4
2
Gift Card(B&N)
3
Gift Card(Movie)
1
Cowbell
5
5
2
Gift Card(Union)
3
Tumbler
1
Cowbell
5
6
2
Gift Card(Union)
3
Tumbler
Notes: There were 10 participants in session 4.
Task

Choice
Set

Price

total votes

6
8
7
6
8
7
5
7
7
5
7
7
10
5
7
10
5
7

6
4
0
3
6
1
2
2
6
3
2
5
3
7
0
3
6
1

Deciding the Goods to be used in Final Experiments
Choice sets 1, 3, and 5 were used in the final experiment. Choice set 4 was not
used in the final experiment because the mug with price zero in task 4 session 1 and task
1, session 2 has been voted most. According to the feedback from participants, some
participants stated that they chose mug because it is zero cost. If most participants choose
mug because it is zero priced and they also expect mug will receive most votes, then
there will be less strategic incentives. We decided to avoid this uninteresting situation
when it is highly possible that a certain item will be a clear winner as most people will
not have an incentive to vote strategically. Choice set 2 was not used in the final
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experiments because no comparison of participants’ choices under two decision rules was
elicited regarding choice set 2 in pretest.
In final experiments, we relabeled choice sets 1, 3 and 5 as choice sets B, A and C,
respectively (refer to Table 5.5).
Table 5.5

Final Experimental Choice Set
Choice
Set
A

B

C

Item
Number
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

Item Description
Gift Card(Union)
Gift Card(B&N)
Tumbler
Gift Card(Union)
Gift Card(B&N)
Gift Card(Movie)
Cowbell
Gift Card(Union)
Tumbler
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Price
6
8
7
5
7
7
10
5
7

CHAPTER VI
EXPERIMENT RESULTS

This chapter discusses experimental results and data analyses, from both pretest
sessions and final experiment sessions.
Data Analyses of Pretest
Percentage of Various Types of Voting Behaviors
As stated in chapter iii, a participant is characterized as a mismatch voter if he
cast different votes under two decision rules. He is characterized as voting for his secondmost preferred option if his choice under the plurality rule is his second-most preferred
option. Strategic voting is detected by examining: first, whether the participant perceived
his unconditionally most preferred option will receive fewest votes under the plurality
rule; second, whether the participant voted for his unconditionally second-most preferred
option under the plurality rule given his perception about his unconditionally most
preferred option.
Table 6.1 shows the frequency of mismatch voting, voting for second-most
preferred option (condition Ⅰ), holding the perception that one’s unconditionally most
preferred option has no chance of winning (condition Ⅱ) and strategic voting in each
choice set. The first row shows that for a strategic voter, both condition Ⅰ and Ⅱ must
hold.
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The second column shows the number of participants for each choice set. There
were 13, 14, 15 and 10 participants in pretest session 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Choice
set 1 was voted for two times under two decision rules in pretest session 3 and 4. Choice
set 3 was in pretest session 2, 3 and 4. Choice set 4 was in pretest session 2 and 3. Choice
set 5 was in pretest session 1, 2, 3 and 4. No results are reported for choice set 2 because
choice set 2 was only used in pretest session 1 and was voted only under the plurality
rule. So there were 25, 39, 14, 52 participants for each choice set respectively.
As Table 6.1 shows, 26.15% of participants in total cast different votes for a given
choice set under two decision rules. In total, 15.38% of participants voted for their
second-most preferred option. Finally, when it comes to no chance perception and
strategic voting, the percentages drop to 6.92% and 1.54% in total.
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# of
Participants

# of Mismatch
Votes

1

25

4
(16.00%)
6
(15.38%)
1
(7.14%)
9
(17.31%)
20
(15.38%)

# of Votes for
Unconditionally
Second-most Preferred
Option

Condition Ⅰ

Pretest Sessions: Percentages of Different Types of Voting

8
(32.00%)
10
3
39
(25.64%)
4
4
14
(28.57%)
12
5
52
(23.08%)
34
Average
(26.15%)
Notes: Percentages are in parentheses.

Choice
Set

Table 6.1
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# of Participant
Thinks His Most
Preferred will
Receive Fewest
Votes
4
(16.00%)
0
(0.00%)
1
(7.14%)
4
(7.69%)
9
(6.92%)

Condition Ⅱ

1
(4.00%)
0
0
0
0
1
(1.92%)
2
(1.54%)

# of Strategic Voting

Condition Ⅰ and Ⅱ

Data Analyses of Final Experiments
Experiment Outcomes
We conducted eight sessions of final experiment design during the weekdays in
the first three weeks in October 2012. There were 10-14 participants in each session. A
total of 99 participants did the final experiments. Participants were recruited by
classroom announcement and campus flyers. Participants were mostly MSU students,
while not restricted to students. The demographic information of participants is shown in
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3.
Table 6.2

Final Experiments: Demographic Information Summary

Variable
Sample Mean (s.d.)
Min
Max
# of Obs
Male
0.41 (0.50)
0
1
99
Age
21.15 (4.87)
18
44
99
Notes: Male is a binary variable equal 1 when the participant is male and 0 when
participant is female.
Table 6.3

Final Experiments: Race Frequency Count
Race
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian
others
Total

52

Frequency
19
20
3
1
55
1
99

Final Experiments: Voting Results by Choice Set

Votes by Session
Choice
I
Decision Rule
Set Item #
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Session 6 Session 7 Session 8
1
6
2
3
1
4
7
5
8
Plurality Rule
A
2
8
6
6
9
8
4
6
3
3
0
2
2
3
2
2
0
2
1
6
3
3
1
5
5
8
4
A
2
Pay and Go Rule
8
4
6
9
7
6
3
7
3
0
3
2
3
2
2
0
2
1
7
4
3
6
4
0
5
5
B
2
Plurality Rule
1
6
6
4
4
6
4
4
3
2
4
5
3
3
7
2
4
1
7
4
3
5
4
3
5
4
B
2
Pay and Go Rule
1
6
5
6
3
7
6
4
3
2
4
6
2
4
3
0
5
1
4
3
5
5
5
3
4
3
C
2
Plurality Rule
9
7
2
4
5
9
5
5
3
1
3
4
4
1
1
1
6
1
5
3
5
6
4
2
4
4
C
2
8
7
4
4
4
10
4
5
Pay and Go Rule
3
1
3
2
3
3
1
2
5
Total Participants
14
13
11
13
10
11
13
14

Table 6.4
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Table 6.4 shows the total number of votes each item receives under either
decision rule in each choice set and session. Bold numbers indicate cases where strategic
consideration in voting under the plurality rule results in a different item receiving the
most votes than when every participant votes for their unconditionally most preferred
option. For example, in session 1 choice set B, in actual voting under the plurality rule,
item 2 receives most votes. Participants’ choices under the pay-and-go rule reveal that the
winning item would be item 3 if every participant chooses their unconditionally most
preferred option under the plurality rule. Similar scenarios could be found in session 2 set
2, session 3 set 3, session 4 set 2, session 4 set 3, session 5 set 4, session 6 set 3, session 7
set 3, session 8 set 4. In 33.33% of the voting scenarios in our experiment, voting for
items other than one’s unconditionally most preferred option could lead a different voting
outcome under the plurality rule than that when every participant votes for their
unconditionally most preferred option.
Detecting Strategic Voting
Table 6.5 displays the percentages of participants for each choice set who cast a
mismatch vote, who voted for unconditionally second-most preferred option, who thinks
that his unconditionally most preferred option will receive fewest votes, and who is a
strategic voter that voted for his unconditionally second-most preferred option. For each
choice set, there are 99 observations as the total number of participants is 99 and every
participant voted for all three choice sets.
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Table 6.5

Final Experiments: Percentages of Different Types of Voting
Condition Ⅰ

Condition Ⅱ

Condition Ⅰ
and Ⅱ

% of
% of votes for
Participant
% of
Choice
# Of
% of mismatch unconditionally Thinks His
Strategic
Set
Observations
votes
second-most Most Preferred
Votes
preferred option will receive
fewest votes
0.182***
0.071***
0.040**
0.162***
A
99
(0.040)
(0.0259)
(0.0199)
(0.0372)
0.162***
0.071***
0.020
0.172***
B
99
(0.037)
(0.0259)
(0.0142)
(0.0381)
0.212***
0.131***
0.030*
0.010
C
99
(0.041)
(0.0341)
(0.0173)
(0.0101)
0.185***
0.155***
0.057***
0.024***
Average
(0.023)
(0.021)
(0.0135)
(0.0088)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
An average of 18.5% of participants cast a vote other than his unconditionally
most preferred option. The proportion tests result for each choice set show the
percentages of mismatch voters are significantly greater than 0. Thus we fail to reject
hypothesis 1 (see Chapter Error! Reference source not found.).
Out of the participants who voted for an item other than his unconditionally most
preferred one, 83.6% (15.5%/18.5%) actually voted for their unconditionally secondmost preferred option. 36.6% (5.7%/15.5%) of these participants who voted for their

unconditionally second-most preferred option indicated that they also held the perception
that their unconditionally most preferred option would receive fewest votes.
The average percentage of detected strategic voters (2.4%) in the total participant
pool is significantly greater than 0, but is quite low compared to existing evidence of
strategic voting in political election settings (1.4%-4.2% from Kawai & Watanabe (2012);
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6.0% from Blais and Nadeau (1996); 7.2% from Alvarez and Nagler (2000); 13% from
Abramson et al. (1992); 17% from Niemi et al. (1992)). The low percentage suggests that
strategic voting may not significantly undermine the validity of the assumption for choice
modeling. Instead, the more general problem of people not choosing their unconditionally
most preferred option may pose difficulties for researchers who use choice experiments
in environmental valuation. Following the logic in Blais & Nadeau (1996), we ascribed
this low percentage to the reality that many voters have no incentive to be engaged in
strategic voting, given that their favorite is perceived to be in the first of second place. If,
instead, detecting strategic voters is restricted to participants who are in the position to
make a decision whether or not to engage in strategic voting behaviors, that is,
participants who perceive his unconditionally most preferred option will receive fewest
votes, 41.6% (2.4%/5.7%) of potential strategic voters actually engaged in strategic
voting.
Out of the participants who cast different votes under two decision rules, 12.7%
(2.4%/18.5%) of them are consistent with our conditions for strategic voting. The t-test in
Table 6.6 result shows it is significantly greater than 0. Thus hypothesis 2 cannot be
rejected.
Table 6.6

Final Experiments: T test of Strategic Voting
H2: the percentage of mismatch voting consistent with
strategic voting is significantly greater than 0.
N
Mean
Std Dev
DF
t Value
Pr > |t|
55
0.127
0.336
54
2.81
0.007
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Logit Model Regression Results
Models in chapter iv are estimated by logit regressions. We represent the
equations from chapter iv here for convenience. The variable description can also be
found in chapter iv. The regression results are as in Table 6.7.

mismatchi  ai 0  ai1nochance  ai 2 prompting  ai 3later
 ai 4 seta  ai 5 setb  ai 6 white  ai 7 male  ai 8age   i

(4.1)

voteforsei  bi 0  bi1nochance  bi 2 prompting  bi 3later
bi 4 seta  bi 5 setb  bi 6 white  bi 7 male  bi8age   i

(4.2)

The total number of observation is 297 as each participant voted for three
different choice sets and 99 participants participated in the experiment. Favorite has no
chance to win is significantly greater than zero in for both mismatch and vote for second
preferred, indicating that the participant has higher chance of casting mismatch votes and
voting for his unconditionally second-most preferred option under the plurality rule if he
holds the perception that his unconditionally most preferred option would receive fewest
votes.
The coefficients for voting for choice set that comes third and prompting
treatment variables in both models are insignificant. Thus both the prompting hypothesis
and the learning hypothesis are rejected (see chapter iv). Mismatch voting does not
appear to increase if respondent are first prompted to think about the votes of others or if
they are voting on a later choice set.
An alternative to test prompting hypothesis is through a proportion test between
the prompting treatment and the control treatment. The test result in 0 is consistent with
the regression result. No significant difference between treatments is observed.
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Table 6.7

Final Experiments: Logistic Regression Results

Dependent variables:
Mismatch
Vote for Second Preferred
Intercept
-1.170
-0.786
(0.840)
(0.974)
Favorite has no chance
1.428***
1.600***
to win
(0.538)
(0.542)
Prompting treatment
-0.367
-0.451
(0.314)
(0.339)
Voting for choice set
0.143
0.391
(0.341)
(0.357)
that comes third
Voting for choice set A
0.114
-0.195
(0.402)
(0.409)
Voting for choice set B
0.435
-0.238
(0.380)
(0.410)
White
-0.868***
-0.646*
(0.334)
(0.358)
Male
0.084
0.150
(0.314)
(0.336)
Age
-0.005
-0.027
(0.034)
(0.041)
Likelihood Ratio
14.990
13.453
Pr> ChiSq
0.059
0.092
N
297
297
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Table 6.8

Final Experiments: T test of Prompting Treatment
N
297

DF
295

t Value
0.8

Pr > |t|
0.427

Choice set variables are insignificant. It shows no significant difference in
mismatch and vote for second preferred exists between different choice sets. Except for
race, the personal characteristic variables are insignificant. The coefficient of white is
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significantly smaller than zero, indicating that white people are less likely to cast a
mismatch vote and vote for his unconditionally second-most preferred option.
Preference Distribution Data
We elicited participants’ perception about preference distribution in the
questionnaire. In Myerson & Weber (1993), the key assumption for deriving equilibria is
that everyone has the same preference distribution knowledge, that is, the preference
distribution is common knowledge, and everyone knows that preference distribution is
common knowledge. In our experiment, participants responded with various answers to
the preference distribution question (see question 1 in chapter iv), indicating that they
hold different perception about preference distribution. Most of them also do not believe
others have the same perception of preference distribution as he does; only 2 of 99
participants thought all other participants gave the same answers to the question 1 as he
did. This non-symmetric belief about the preference distribution renders difficulties in
deriving equilibria in our experiment. One possible reason that most participants held
non-symmetric belief is that unlike the polls in elections, in our experiment, no prior
information about participants’ preference was given before voting. It suggests future
researchers to induce symmetric beliefs if they would like to derive the voting equilibria.
Out of 99 participants, 47 participants think he understood the question (refer to
question 2 in questionnaire in chapter iv) right away; 46 participants struggled a bit at
first, but eventually understood the questions; and 6 participants were “still not sure”
about what was asked in the question. So the cognitive complexity of the preference
distribution question does not raise too much concern.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Summary
This study sets up experiments to evaluate the assumption in choice modeling that
people choose the option that gives them unconditional highest utility level. Participants
were asked to choose among three priced private items, under two different decision
rules, the pay-and-go rule and the plurality rule. Apart from choosing, participants were
asked to answer questions regarding their perception about other people’s votes and their
own unconditionally second-most preferred option. Prompting treatment was introduced
to control for the effect brought by the order of experiment questions. Observations from
earlier and later periods of the experiment were compared to examine whether there was
a learning effect.
Participants’ votes under either rule were compared. Under the assumption that
the participant chose their unconditionally most preferred option under the pay-and-go
rule, we conclude whether the participant chose their favorite under the plurality rule.
Participants who cast different votes under two decision rules were characterized as
mismatch voters. With additional information elicited in the experiment, participants
were furthered categorized as voting for second-most preferred and strategic voters.
Proportion tests examined whether there are significantly different percentages of
mismatch voters and voters who chose their unconditionally second-most preferred
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option under the plurality rule between different treatments regarding prompting effects
and learning effects. In the logit regression model, it is examined whether participant
holds the particular perception that their unconditional most preferred option will receive
fewest votes would affect their voting behavior.
Conclusions and Implications
Three main conclusions can be made. First, people do not always vote for their
unconditionally most preferred choice under the plurality rule. In our experiment, an
average of 18.5% participants cast a vote other than his unconditionally most preferred
option. This implies that the traditional assumption in choice modeling that participant
choose their unconditionally most preferred option might not hold. A remaining question
is how the presence of mismatch voters would affect welfare estimates and the threshold
of the percentage of mismatch voters that would render the welfare estimates problematic,
as welfare estimates are objectives for most environmental choice experiment surveys.
Our experiment was not designed optimally for estimating welfare measures, however,
but for detecting strategic voting.
Out of the participants who cast different votes under two decision rules, 12.7%
voted consistently with our sufficient condition for strategic voting. Of all participants,
only 2.54% can be characterized as strategic voting by our conditions, which is quite low
compared to existing evidence about strategic voting which ranges from 1.4% to 17%.
Even though the threshold of the percentage of mismatch voters that would render the
welfare estimates problematic remains a topic for future research, we suspect that
strategic voting may not significantly undermine the validity of choice experiments
because of its low occurrence percentage.
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Other reasons that might lead to mismatch voting need to be examined. The
implication for choice experiments is that in order to reduce the occurrence of not
choosing one’s unconditionally most preferred option, researchers need to discover the
other motivations beyond strategic voting, as defined in this thesis, that lead to
participants voting for an alternative other than their unconditionally most preferred.
The second conclusion is that more mismatch voting and voting for second-most
preferred option occur when the participant holds the perception that his unconditionally
most preferred option has no chance of winning. The implication for real life choice
experiments is that in order to elicit unconditional most preferred option, it might be
helpful to indicate participants to consider only their preference, not the prospect of each
candidate being chosen when they vote.
Thirdly, prompting participants to consider others’ votes does not significantly
increase the occurrence of mismatch voting or voting for unconditionally second-most
preferred option. As the treatment tests show, the order of perception questions and
voting questions makes no significant difference in the observation of strategic or
mismatch voting. Also, acquaintance with the experiment procedure at earlier stage of the
experiment session does not significantly increase participants’ strategic behavior at late
stage of the experiment session. Both of these findings imply that future research
employing an induced-value framework may be relieved from the concern that
experiment results are an artifact of the experiment design. As our experiment result
shows, participants engage in unconditional preference revealing and strategic voting
equally in different experiment treatments.
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An extension of this study could examine the effect of not choosing one’s
unconditionally most preferred option on the welfare estimates. Future research could
examine whether people choose their unconditionally most preferred option in real life
choice experiments.
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Make sure we have everyone’s signed consent form before we begin!!]
[Pay show-up fee to any alternates]
[Intro]
Hello, and welcome to today’s experiment. My name is Dr. Matthew Interis, and
this is Julie. [Casually] Ok, there are (number of participants)
of you here
today.
Please listen carefully as I explain today’s experiment. Please don’t open any
envelopes on your desk until you are told to do so.
[Julie writes in the number of participants present in Question 1 of the
questionnaires]
The majority of the experiment will consist of each of you choosing 1 of 3 items
that are available to you at different prices. Each of you is starting out with $10 and you
will pay for the item you receive out of this $10, so you won’t be using any of your own
money. Ok, so each of you has been given $10 to start with. In addition, everyone
earns $5 for showing up today. The item and total amount of cash you leave the
experiment with today depend on the choices that you and the other participants in the
room make.
You’ll also answer a short questionnaire which asks some questions about your
preferences and asks for some basic demographic data.
None of the information collected during the experiment will be traceable to you
personally; all your responses are strictly anonymous, and are identified only by a
participant number that is unique to you. However your participation number is not
traceable to you personally. Your participant number is written on a small piece of paper
that is paper-clipped to the large envelope on your desk. Look at your number, but leave
the slip paper-clipped to the large envelope since you may need it later. As you go
through the experiment today, please make sure the participant number at the top of each
of your worksheets is correct.
Are there any questions so far? [pause] Ok, if you have any questions at any time
during the experiment, please raise your hand and I’ll come over to you to answer your
question.
[Plurality Vote Tasks]
At the front of the room are five items, a Cowbell, a Tumbler cup, a $12 gift
certificate to Barnes and Noble, an $11 gift certificate to our local movie theater,
Hollywood Cinemas, and a $10 gift certificate to the union. The gift certificates to
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Barnes and Noble and the movie theater never expires. The gift certificate to the union
expires on the last day of this calendar year, December 31, and is valid at any of the
restaurants in the union except Panda Express, and is also valid at Einstein Bros. Bagels
and Burger King. If you use the union gift card for less than $10, you don’t get to keep
the balance.
On the projector screen, we are going to show you these items 3 at a time. There
will be a price for each item and, should you receive one of the pictured items, you will
pay the price out of your initial $10. So you’ll leave the experiment with the item you
receive, any cash left over from $10 after paying the price of the item, plus the $5 fee for
simply showing up today.
You are going to choose 1 of the 3 items 6 times total. This means you will make
6 decisions, which we call “tasks”. At the end of the experiment, I will roll a die,
which will determine which task is “binding”, that is, which task actually matters.
The tasks are completely independent, which means that your decisions in a
particular task in no way affect what item you’ll receive or how much you’ll pay for
it if another task is chosen by the roll of the die. So, for example, if I roll a 4, then
everyone’s decision in the fourth task will be used to determine which item each of you
leaves with and how much you have to pay for that item, and the decisions you made in
the other tasks, tasks 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, are irrelevant.
So, are there any questions at this point? [pause]
Ok, now please open and remove the contents of only the smaller envelope on
your desk. Julie will come around to collect your empty envelope. You will find six
sheets of papers which have the task number and your participant number at the top.
Please find the sheet labeled “Task 1” at the top. Before we complete task 1, we are
going to go through an example, so please listen carefully and don’t write anything until I
say to do so.
Please look at the projector screen. On the screen you will see an example of
what you will be doing in task 1. This is just an example, so please don’t write
anything yet. As you can see there are 3 items, and each has a price. You will each
choose an item in this task. Suppose at the end of the experiment, I roll a 1. Then, Julie
will announce which of these three items most people chose, and then everyone will go
home with that item after paying the price out of your initial $10. So, for example, if 5
people choose the Movies gift card, 6 people choose the Union gift card, and 5 people
choose the cowbell, then everyone will leave the experiment with the Union gift card and
$11 in cash. Where did the $11 come from? Well, everyone gets $5 simply for showing
up today. And, since you initially had $10, but you paid $4 for the gift card, you earn $6
from that for a total of $11 in cash. In the event of a tie between items that have the most
votes, I will determine which item everyone leaves with by rolling the die.
Are there any questions?
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Okay, now we’ll do task 1 for real.
[Task 1]
Look at the projector screen and you will see the set of items and their
corresponding prices for Task 1. Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. If I
roll a 1 at the end of the experiment, then everyone leaves the experiment with whichever
item most people choose in this task and everyone pays the price associated with that
item. On your sheet labeled “Task 1”, please choose an item by circling its item number.
Take your time, and, after you’ve circled your response, Julie will come around to
collect your responses. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 1a – meanwhile, Julie counts the votes from task 1]
Before we move on to task 2, we’d like you to answer a question about task 1.
Now please open the large envelope and completely remove its contents. You will find a
sheet that says “Task 1a” at the top. Task 1a. Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please please raise your hand. You should circle
one and only one of the letters and answer any questions associated with your response.
After you have completed it, Julie will come around and collect it from you. Please fold
the piece of paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 2]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 2” and look at the projector screen.
Task 2 is a little different from the previous task, so please listen carefully. If I roll a
2 at the end of the experiment, then you will simply pay for and leave with which ever
item you choose in this task - the choices of other people in the room are irrelevant to
the item you receive if I roll a 2. And remember, the tasks are completely independent,
so once again you should choose as if you have $10 to spend on one of these items.
Please look at the projector screen for the three items in this set and their corresponding
prices. On your sheet labeled “Task 2”, please circle your response. Then Julie will
come around to collect your responses. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your
responses.
[Task 2a]
Before we move on to task 3, we’d like you to answer a question about task 2.
Julie is passing out a sheet labeled “Task 2a.” Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed
it, Julie will come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to
hide your responses.
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[Task 3]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 3” and look at the projector screen to
find a new set of items and prices. Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. The
process is similar to task 1. If I roll a 3 at the end of the experiment, then everyone leaves
the experiment with whichever item most people choose in this task and everyone pays
the price associated with that item. On your sheet, please choose an item by circling its
item number.
Take your time, and, after you’ve circled your response, Julie will come around to
collect your responses. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 3a – meanwhile, Julie organizes and counts the votes from tasks 2 and 3]
Before we move on to task 4, we’d like you to answer a question about task 3.
Please find your large sheet labeled “Task 3a.” Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have
completed it, Julie will come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of
paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 4]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 4” and look at the projector screen.
Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. The process is similar to task 2. If I
roll a 4 at the end of the experiment, then you will simply pay for and leave with which
ever item you choose in this task - the choices of other people in the room are
irrelevant to the item you receive if I roll a 4. Please look at the projector screen for
the three items in this set and their corresponding prices. On your sheet labeled “Task 4”,
please circle your response. Then Julie will come around to collect your responses.
Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 4a]
Before we move on to task 5, we’d like you to answer a question about task 4.
Julie is passing out a sheet labeled “Task 4a.” Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed
it, Julie will come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to
hide your responses.
[Task 5]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 5” and look at the projector screen to
find a new set of items and prices. Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. If I
roll a 5 at the end of the experiment, then everyone leaves the experiment with whichever
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item most people choose in this task and everyone pays the price associated with that
item. On your sheet, please choose an item by circling its item number.
Take your time, and, after you’ve circled your response, Julie will come around to
collect your responses. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 5a – meanwhile, Julie organizes and counts the votes from tasks 4 and 5]
Before we move on to task 6, we’d like you to answer a question about task 5.
Please find your large sheet labeled “Task 5a.” Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have
completed it, Julie will come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of
paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 6]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 6” and look at the projector screen.
Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. If I roll a 6 at the end of the
experiment, then you will simply pay for and leave with which ever item you choose
in this task - the choices of other people in the room are irrelevant to the item you
receive if I roll a 6. Please look at the projector screen for the three items in this set and
their corresponding prices. On your sheet labeled “Task 6”, please circle your response.
Then Julie will come around to collect your responses. Please fold the piece of paper in
half to hide your responses.
[Task 6a]
Before we move on, we’d like you to answer a question about task 6. Julie is
passing out a sheet labeled “Task 6a.” Please carefully read the sheet and complete it. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed it, Julie will
come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your
responses.
[Questionnaire – meanwhile, Julie organizes the votes from task 6]
Your last task is to answer a short questionnaire. Julie is now passing out a short
questionnaire for you to complete. [Pause] Please double check that your questionnaire
has your participant number on it. Please take your time and complete the questionnaire.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. When you are finished, Julie will
come around and collect it from you. Please fold the paper in half to hide your responses.
[Determining the good]
As I stated earlier, I will now roll a die to determine which task is binding. [Roll
the die]. The number is
. So the choices everyone made in task
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will be used to determine which item everyone leaves with. [Scroll the power point to
task
]
[…If task 1, 3, or 5]
Julie, which item of task
So, everyone will receive the
each of you will leave with the
$5 show-up payment.

received the most votes? [Julie responds]
at a price of $
. This means
and $
in cash total, including the

Thank you very much for participating! We really do appreciate it. Please form a
line, and Julie will give you your item and your cash payment. You will just have to sign
a receipt form and then you are free to go. Thanks again.
[…If task 2, 4, or 6]
In task {2, 4, 6}, you will simply receive the item you chose and pay the specified
price. So you’ll leave with the item you chose, any cash left over from your initial $10,
plus $5 for showing-up today.
Thank you very much for participating! We really do appreciate it. Please form a
line and have the slip with your participant number handy. Julie will give you your item
and your cash payment. You will just have to sign a receipt form and then you are free to
go. Thanks again.
[Julie fills out the item and cash amount on the receipt form for each person. Julie
gives them the item and the carbon copy of the receipt form. Dr. Interis gives them the
cash.]
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[Make sure we have everyone’s signed consent form before we begin!!]
[Pay show-up fee to any alternates]
[Intro]
Hello, and welcome to today’s experiment. My name is Dr. Matthew Interis, and
this is Julie. [Casually] Ok, there are (number of participants)
of you here
today.
Please listen carefully as I explain today’s experiment. Please don’t open any
envelopes on your desk until you are told to do so.
[Julie writes in the number of participants present in Question 1 of the
questionnaires]
The majority of the experiment will consist of each of you choosing 1 of 3 items
that are available to you at different prices. Each of you is starting out with $10 and you
will pay for the item you receive out of this $10, so you won’t be using any of your own
money. Ok, so each of you has been given $10 to start with. In addition, everyone
earns $5 for showing up today. The item and total amount of cash you leave the
experiment with today depend on the choices that you and the other participants in the
room make.
You’ll also answer a short questionnaire which asks some questions about your
preferences and asks for some basic demographic data.
None of the information collected during the experiment will be traceable to you
personally; all your responses are strictly anonymous, and are identified only by a
participant number that is unique to you. However your participation number is not
traceable to you personally. Your participant number is written on a small piece of paper
that is paper-clipped to the large envelope on your desk. Look at your number, but leave
the slip paper-clipped to the large envelope since you may need it later. As you go
through the experiment today, please make sure the participant number at the top of each
of your worksheets is correct.
Are there any questions so far? [pause] Ok, if you have any questions at any time
during the experiment, please raise your hand and I’ll come over to you to answer your
question.
[Plurality Vote Tasks]
At the front of the room are five items, a Cowbell, a Tumbler cup, a $12 gift
certificate to Barnes and Noble, an $11 gift certificate to our local movie theater,
Hollywood Cinemas, and a $10 gift certificate to the union. The gift certificates to
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Barnes and Noble and the movie theater never expires. The gift certificate to the union
expires on the last day of this calendar year, December 31, and is valid at any of the
restaurants in the union except Panda Express, and is also valid at Einstein Bros. Bagels
and Burger King. If you use the union gift card for less than $10, you don’t get to keep
the balance.
On the projector screen, we are going to show you these items 3 at a time. There
will be a price for each item and, should you receive one of the pictured items, you will
pay the price out of your initial $10. So you’ll leave the experiment with the item you
receive, any cash left over from $10 after paying the price of the item, plus the $5 fee for
simply showing up today.
You are going to choose 1 of the 3 items 6 times total. This means you will make
6 decisions, which we call “tasks”. At the end of the experiment, I will roll a die,
which will determine which task is “binding”, that is, which task actually matters.
The tasks are completely independent, which means that your decisions in a
particular task in no way affect what item you’ll receive or how much you’ll pay for
it if another task is chosen by the roll of the die. So, for example, if I roll a 4, then
everyone’s decision in the fourth task will be used to determine which item each of you
leaves with and how much you have to pay for that item, and the decisions you made in
the other tasks, tasks 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, are irrelevant.
So, are there any questions at this point? [pause]
Please look at the projector screen. On the screen you will see an example of
what you will be doing in task 1. This is just an example. As you can see there are 3
items, and each has a price. You will each choose an item in this task. Suppose at the
end of the experiment, I roll a 1. Then, Julie will announce which of these three items
most people chose, and then everyone will go home with that item after paying the price
out of your initial $10. So, for example, if 5 people choose the Movies gift card, 6 people
choose the Union gift card, and 5 people choose the cowbell, then everyone will leave
the experiment with the Union gift card and $11 in cash. Where did the $11 come from?
Well, everyone gets $5 simply for showing up today. And, since you initially had $10,
but you paid $4 for the gift card, you earn $6 from that for a total of $11 in cash. In the
event of a tie between items that have the most votes, I will determine which item
everyone leaves with by rolling the die.
Are there any questions?
Ok, now please look at the projector screen and you will see the set of items and
their corresponding prices for the real Task 1. Again, in this task, you will each choose an
item. If I roll a 1 at the end of the experiment, then everyone leaves the experiment
with whichever item most people choose in this task and everyone pays the price
associated with that item.
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[Task 1a]
But before you complete task 1, we’d like you to answer a question. Please open
the large envelope only and completely remove its contents. You will find three sheets
of paper. Please find the sheet labeled “Task 1a” at the top and make sure that it has your
correct participant number. Task 1a. Please carefully read the sheet and complete it. If
you have any questions, please please raise your hand. You should circle one and only
one of the letters and answer any questions associated with your response. After you
have completed it, fold it in half to hide your answers, hold it up, and I’ll come around
and collect it from you.
[Task 1]
Now you’ll make your real choice for task 1. Please open only the smaller
envelope on your desk and completely remove its contents. Find the half sheet that’s
labeled “Task 1” at the top. Task 1. On your sheet, please choose an item by circling its
item number.
Take your time, and, after you’ve circled your response, fold your paper in half to
hide your answers, hold it up, and Julie will come around to collect your responses.
[Task 2 – meanwhile, Julie counts the votes from task 1]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 2” and look at the projector screen to
see the three items in this set and their corresponding prices. Task 2 is a little different
from the previous task, so please listen carefully. If I roll a 2 at the end of the
experiment, then you will simply pay for and leave with which ever item you choose in
this task - the choices of other people in the room are irrelevant to the item you
receive if I roll a 2. And remember, the tasks are completely independent, so once again
you should choose as if you have $10 to spend on one of these items. On your sheet
labeled “Task 2”, please circle your response, fold your paper in half to hide your
answers and hold it up. Then Julie will come around to collect your responses.
[Task 2a]
Before we move on to task 3, we’d like you to answer a question about task 2.
Julie is passing out a sheet labeled “Task 2a.” Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed
it, I’ll come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide
your responses.
[Task 3a – meanwhile, Julie organizes the votes from tasks 2]
Ok, now please look at the projector screen to find a new set of items and prices
for task 3. Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. The process is similar to
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task 1. If I roll a 3 at the end of the experiment, then everyone leaves the experiment
with whichever item most people choose in this task and everyone pays the price
associated with that item.
But before you complete task 3, we’d like you to answer a question. Please find
your large sheet labeled “Task 3a.” Please carefully read the sheet and complete it. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed it, I’ll come
around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your
responses.
[Task 3]
Now you’ll make your real choice for task 3. Julie is passing out a half sheet
labeled “Task 3” at the top. On your sheet, please choose an item by circling its item
number.
Take your time, and, after you’ve circled your response, fold your paper in half to
hide your answers, hold it up, and Julie will come around to collect your responses.
[Task 4 – meanwhile, Julie counts the votes from task 3]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 4” and look at the projector screen.
Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. The process is similar to task 2. If I
roll a 4 at the end of the experiment, then you will simply pay for and leave with which
ever item you choose in this task - the choices of other people in the room are
irrelevant to the item you receive if I roll a 4. Please look at the projector screen for
the three items in this set and their corresponding prices. On your sheet labeled “Task 4”,
please circle your response. Then Julie will come around to collect your responses.
Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your responses.
[Task 4a]
Before we move on to task 5, we’d like you to answer a question about task 4.
Julie is passing out a sheet labeled “Task 4a.” Please carefully read the sheet and
complete it. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed
it, I’ll come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide
your responses.
[Task 5a – meanwhile, Julie organizes the votes from task 4]
Ok, now please look at the projector screen to find a new set of items and prices
for task 5. Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. The process is similar to
tasks 1 and 3. If I roll a 5 at the end of the experiment, then everyone leaves the
experiment with whichever item most people choose in this task and everyone pays the
price associated with that item.
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But before you complete task 5, we’d like you to answer a question. Please find
your large sheet labeled “Task 5a.” Please carefully read the sheet and complete it. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed it, I’ll come
around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your
responses.
[Task 5]
Now you’ll make your real choice for task 5. Julie is passing out a half sheet
labeled “Task 5” at the top. On your sheet, please choose an item by circling its item
number.
Take your time, and, after you’ve circled your response, fold your paper in half to
hide your answers, hold it up, and Julie will come around to collect your responses.
[Task 6]
Now please find the half sheet labeled “Task 6” and look at the projector screen.
Again, in this task, you will each choose an item. If I roll a 6 at the end of the
experiment, then you will simply pay for and leave with which ever item you choose
in this task - the choices of other people in the room are irrelevant to the item you
receive if I roll a 6. Please look at the projector screen for the three items in this set and
their corresponding prices. On your sheet labeled “Task 6”, please circle your response.
Then Julie will come around to collect your responses. Please fold the piece of paper in
half to hide your responses.
[Task 6a]
Before we move on, we’d like you to answer a question about task 6. Julie is
passing out a sheet labeled “Task 6a.” Please carefully read the sheet and complete it. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand. After you have completed it, Julie will
come around and collect it from you. Please fold the piece of paper in half to hide your
responses.
and 6]

[Questionnaire – meanwhile, Julie organizes and counts the votes from tasks 5

Your last task is to answer a short questionnaire. Julie is now passing out a short
questionnaire for you to complete. [Pause] Please double check that your questionnaire
has your participant number on it. Please take your time and complete the questionnaire.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. When you are finished, I’ll come
around and collect it from you. Please fold the paper in half to hide your responses.
[Determining the good]
80

As I stated earlier, I will now roll a die to determine which task is binding. [Roll
the die]. The number is
. So the choices everyone made in task
will be used to determine which item everyone leaves with. [Scroll the power point to
task
]
[…If task 1, 3, or 5]
Julie, which item of task
So, everyone will receive the
each of you will leave with the
$5 show-up payment.

received the most votes? [Julie responds]
and $

at a price of $
. This means
in cash total, including the

Thank you very much for participating! We really do appreciate it. Please form a
line, and Julie will give you your item and your cash payment. You will just have to sign
a receipt form and then you are free to go. Thanks again.
[…If task 2, 4, or 6]
In task {2, 4, 6}, you will simply receive the item you chose and pay the specified
price. So you’ll leave with the item you chose, any cash left over from your initial $10,
plus $5 for showing-up today.
Thank you very much for participating! We really do appreciate it. Please form a
line and have the slip with your participant number handy. You can take your consent
form with you and leave everything else on your desk. Julie will give you your item and
your cash payment. You will just have to sign a receipt form and then you are free to go.
Thanks again.
[Julie fills out the item and cash amount on the receipt form for each person. Julie
gives them the item and the carbon copy of the receipt form. Dr. Interis gives them the
cash.]
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Questionnaire
201
Please take your time and answer the questions. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand and someone will come over to assist you.
Questions about today’s experiment
Note: Questions 1 and 2 refer only to task 6.
1) The following table shows some possible preference rankings over the three
items in task 6 at their respective prices (look at the projector screen for a reminder of
the items and their prices). There are
participants in the experiment today.
Based on your best guess, please write in the column the percentage of people in today’s
experiment that you believe would have the specified preference ranking.
My best guess as to the
percentage of participants
here today with these
preferences is:
Prefers item 1 to item 2, and prefers item 2 to item 3.
Prefers item 1 to item 3, and prefers item 3 to item 2.
Prefers item 2 to item 1, and prefers item 1 to item 3.
Prefers item 2 to item 3, and prefers item 3 to item 1.
Prefers item 3 to item 1, and prefers item 1 to item 2.
Prefers item 3 to item 2, and prefers item 2 to item 1.
Total (cannot be greater than 100%):
2) Do you think you understood what we were asking you to do in the previous
question?
a.
b.

I think I understood right away what you wanted me to do in the previous
question.
I struggled a bit at first, but I think I eventually understood what you
wanted me to do in the previous question.
c.
I am still not sure what you were asking me to do in the previous
question.
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3) In Question 1, you stated your opinion of what percentage of people here today
has various preferences over the three items in task 6. We asked every participant that
same question. Do you think all other participants here today will give the same
answers to the Question 1 as you did? (Note: if you believe even one participant will
give much different responses to the previous question, you should circle “No”.)
Yes

No

4) Recall that in tasks 1a, 3a, and 5a, you were asked to state your perceptions of
how you thought participants would vote over the three items in tasks 1, 3, and 5,
respectively. Do you think you understood what we were asking you to do in tasks 1a,
3a, and 5a?
a.
b.
5a.

I think I understood right away what you wanted me to do in tasks 1a, 3a,
and 5a.
I struggled a bit at first, but I think I eventually understood what you
wanted me to do in tasks 1a, 3a, and 5a.
c.
I am still not sure what you wanted me to do in tasks 1a, 3a, and

Background Questions
1) What is your sex?

Male

2) What is your race?

American Indian or Alaska Native
Arabic or Middle Eastern
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian

3) What is your age?

Female

years

Feedback
We would appreciate any feedback you have on this experiment. This feedback is
completely voluntary. In particular we are interested in whether the directions wereclear,
whether you could hear the administrator, whether the sheets were clear, etc. Thank you!
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